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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Snyder v. Louisiana,1 the United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 
ruling, overturned a first-degree murder conviction and death 
sentence, holding that the trial court erred when it found that the 
prosecution’s use of racially motivated peremptory challenges had not 
violated the precedent established in Batson v. Kentucky.2 Although 
the Court has previously held that the “trial court has a pivotal role in 
evaluating Batson claims,”3 here, the Court found that the presence of 
“exceptional circumstances” prevented deference to the trial court.4 
In contrast to Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Snyder, Justice 
Thomas, in his dissent, asserted that he would not “second-guess the 
fact-based determinations of the Louisiana courts . . . . Given the trial 
court’s expertise in making credibility determinations and its 
firsthand knowledge of the voir dire exchanges, it is entirely proper to 
defer to its judgment.”5 Snyder demands a higher level of scrutiny 
from trial courts when they determine the presence of racially 
discriminatory intent and urges a more critical analysis of the race-
neutral explanations proffered by lawyers using peremptory 
challenges. Regardless, one must wonder whether Snyder mitigates 
concerns that the use of peremptory challenges prevents impartiality 
 
 * 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008). 
 2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the use of racially discriminatory 
peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 3. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008). 
 4. See id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991) (plurality opinion)). 
 5. Id. at 1212–13, 1215 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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and fairness—hallmarks of the jury system in the United States.6 The 
prevalence of jury consultants, who rely heavily on factors such as 
demographics in determining which potential jurors to strike,7 as well 
as stereotypes that individuals have as a result of societal influences,8 
and of which they are not aware, raises doubts that Snyder will have a 
substantial impact on the jury selection process. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
Allen Snyder was convicted of the first-degree murder of his 
former wife’s boyfriend, and sentenced to death by an all-white jury.9 
Snyder alleged that the all-white jury was selected by the Louisiana 
State prosecutor in a racially discriminatory manner.10 This allegation 
stemmed from the fact that the prosecution used peremptory 
challenges to strike all potential black jurors.11 Although the defense 
objected to the prosecution’s peremptory challenges as racially 
discriminatory, and thus illegal under Batson v. Kentucky,12 the trial 
court denied these objections.13 
 
 6. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 7. See Barry P. Goode, Religion, Politics, Race, and Ethnicity: The Range and Limits of 
Voir Dire, 92 Ky. L.J. 601, 658–59 (2004) (“Fifty years ago, it was widely believed that gender, 
ethnicity, and race were, each by themselves, important factors in jury selection. More recent 
writings by jury consultants show that these factors are still often considered part of the 
‘demographic’ mix, or the ‘profile’ that should be considered in jury selection. Jury consultants 
often urge that questions about such immutable characteristics be included in supplemental jury 
questionnaires.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 8. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 160 (2005) (noting that “race-and gender-based stereotypes 
almost inevitably affect people’s judgment and decision-making, even if people do not 
consciously allow these stereotypes to affect their judgment. This includes attorneys making 
peremptory challenges. . . . Once stereotypes have formed, they affect us even when we are 
aware of them and reject them. Stereotypes can greatly influence the way we perceive, store, 
use, and remember information. Discrimination, understood as biased decision-making, then 
flows from the resulting distorted or unobjective information. The attorney exercising the 
peremptory challenge will be unaware of this biased information processing and so will be 
unaware of her gender-or race-based discrimination. Because she is unaware of her actual 
thought processes, she may not be able to completely or correctly answer why she chose to 
exercise a peremptory challenge.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 9. State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 486 (La. 2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207 (2008). 
 12. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 13. Snyder, 942 So. 2d at 486. 
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A. The Prosecution’s References to the O.J. Simpson Case 
The defense first raised concerns about the prosecution’s racial 
prejudice prior to voir dire.14 At an evidentiary hearing held on July 
29, 1996, the prosecution referred to “another case that was on 
television everyday for the last couple of years . . . where this very 
thing happened.”15 The defense responded to these statements by 
filing a “motion in limine specifically requesting the State be 
precluded at trial from referring to or making comparisons with O.J. 
Simpson or his trial, as such references would serve no purpose other 
than to confuse and prejudice the jury.”16 Although the trial court 
denied the defendant’s motion, the prosecutor promised that he 
would not “at any time during the course of the taking of evidence or 
before the jury in this case, mention the O.J. Simpson case.”17 
Despite the prosecutor’s promise, during the penalty phase of the 
trial the prosecutor again pointed out the similarities between the 
case at hand and that of O.J. Simpson by stating that the crime Snyder 
had been convicted of made him recall “the most famous murder case 
in the last, in probably recorded history, that all of you all are aware 
of.”18 The defense counsel’s objections to these statements were 
overruled when the prosecutor claimed that this particular reference 
to the O.J. Simpson case should be allowed because it was based on 
similarities between defendant’s actions and those of O.J. Simpson.19 
At the conclusion of his trial, Snyder was convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to death.20 
B. Snyder’s Initial Appeal and the United States Supreme Court 
Grant of Certiorari 
Following his conviction and the imposition of the death sentence 
by the trial court, Snyder appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court 
pursuant to Article V, Section V(D) of Louisiana’s Constitution. This 
provision enables a defendant convicted of a capital offense and 
sentenced to death to appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court.21 The 
 
 14. Id. at 497. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 498. 
 19. Id. at 498–99. 
 20. Id. at 486. 
 21. Id. 
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Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Snyder’s conviction and sentence; 
however, the Court “remanded the case to the trial [court] for 
retrospective determination of defendant’s competency at the time of 
trial, if one could be made.”22 The trial court held that such a 
determination was possible and that Snyder was competent at the 
time of his trial.23 Snyder then appealed the trial court’s competency 
ruling to the Louisiana Supreme Court,24 which again affirmed the 
lower court’s finding, as well as his conviction and sentence, 
emphasizing that the trial court had acted in accordance with Snyder’s 
procedural due process rights.25 
The United States Supreme Court granted Snyder’s petition for 
writ of certiorari.26 Then, on June 13, 2005, the Court remanded the 
case back to the Louisiana Supreme Court for additional 
consideration based on the outcome of Miller-El v. Dretke,27 decided 
two weeks earlier.28 In its brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the 
defense insisted that it “consider that the prosecutors selected an all-
white jury as a means of playing their ‘O.J. card.’”29 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, found that the defense 
counsel presented no evidence, aside from inferences from the 
prosecution’s statements, that supported its claim that peremptory 
challenges were used in a discriminatory manner.30 The court 
specifically noted that “[n]either remark [made by the prosecution] 
referred to Simpson’s or Snyder’s race.”31 In light of the holding in 
Miller-El, the court examined all relevant evidence that suggested the 
existence of racial discrimination in establishing whether the trial 
court’s discrimination determination was clearly erroneous.32 After 
also considering the prosecutor’s reasons for striking two black jurors 
during voir dire, the court held that the prosecutor’s reasons for using 
the peremptory challenges were not pretextual and that “race did not 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. State v. Snyder, 874 So. 2d 739 (La. 2004). 
 25. Id. at 745. 
 26. Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005) (mem.). 
 27. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (holding that when considering an alleged 
Batson violation, all evidence must be taken cumulatively to determine whether the 
prosecutor’s peremptory strikes are racially discriminatory). 
 28. Snyder, 545 U.S. 1137 (mem.). 
 29. State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 499 (La. 2006). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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play an impermissible role in the exercise of these strikes.”33 The court 
therefore concluded that there was no Batson v. Kentucky violation 
despite the fact that records from the voir dire proceedings illustrate 
that the prosecutor struck every prospective African American juror 
who had not previously been struck for cause.34 Snyder appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court, which again granted his petition for 
certiorari.35 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S FINDINGS 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito in Snyder v. Louisiana, 
concluded that the prosecution violated the requirement established 
in Batson v. Kentucky that peremptory challenges be race neutral 
based on its peremptory strike of Jeffrey Brooks,36 a potential black 
juror. The Court reiterated the three-pronged Batson test to 
determine whether a peremptory challenge was impermissibly based 
on race, and noted that the third prong was at issue in this case: 
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a 
peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. 
Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer 
a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light 
of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether 
the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.37 
Typically, the Supreme Court defers to the trial court’s 
determination vis-à-vis the third prong of the Batson test, because 
only the trial judge can make “first-hand observations.”38 These 
observations are considered valuable because “the best evidence [of 
discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who 
exercises the challenge.”39 Moreover, because the prosecutor’s race-
neutral explanations often focus on a juror’s demeanor, the trial court 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 839, 841–42 (La. 1999). 
 35. Snyder v. Louisiana, 127 S. Ct. 3004 (2007). 
 36. Although the defense also raised as racially discriminatory the prosecution’s decision to 
strike Elaine Scott—another potential black juror—the Court felt that it would look solely at 
the prosecution’s challenge used against Brooks. If the Court found that challenge to be in 
violation of Batson, it would not need to also examine the challenge of Scott. Snyder v. 
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008). 
 37. Id. at 1207–08 (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 277 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US 322, 328–29 (2003)). 
 38. Id. at 1213. 
 39. Id. (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion)). 
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is seen as best able to gauge the behavior.40 However, the Court made 
clear that Snyder is an “exceptional circumstance[]” in which the 
Supreme Court would not defer to the trial court’s determination.41 
Upon reaching its conclusion that there was a Batson error, the 
Court examined the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations for its 
peremptory challenge to Brooks. The prosecutor claimed that he 
struck Brooks because not only did Brooks appear nervous when the 
prosecutor questioned him, but also because Brooks was a student 
teacher whose duty as a juror would cause him to miss class.42 The 
prosecutor concluded that Brooks’s position as a student teacher, in 
particular, may cause Brooks to come back with a verdict that would 
not impose a penalty phase in an effort to expedite his jury duty. 
Though the trial judge, without explanation, accepted the 
prosecution’s justifications as race-neutral, the Supreme Court 
rejected them. 
A. The Prospective Juror’s Nervousness 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court’s 
determination that an attorney who relies on a potential juror’s 
demeanor or disposition in exercising a peremptory strike should 
typically receive deference when considering whether there was a 
Batson violation.43 Here, however, the trial judge permitted the 
prosecution’s challenge to remove Brooks without any requisite 
prosecutorial explanation.44 Furthermore, the prosecution’s challenge 
did not occur until the day after Brooks’s voir dire, which suggests 
that “the trial judge may not have recalled Mr. Brooks’s demeanor,” 
possibly lessening his credibility as a “first hand observer.”45 Thus, the 
Court found that without an explanation by the trial judge as to why 
he accepted the prosecution’s challenge to remove Brooks, the Court 
“cannot presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor’s 
assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous.”46 
 
 40. Id. at 1208. 
 41. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991) (plurality opinion)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1209. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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B. The Prospective Juror’s Position as a Student Teacher 
The Court also denied the prosecutor’s claim that he struck 
Brooks, not based on race, but due to his position as a student 
teacher.47 Brooks had come forward during voir dire and “expressed 
concern that jury service . . . would interfere with work [and] school,” 
because as a student teacher, he was required to teach five days a 
week from 8:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.48 However, after speaking with the 
Dean of Southern University, the trial court learned that Brooks’s 
service as a juror would not interfere with the three hundred hours of 
observation time required for his teaching, and the Dean assured the 
trial court that he would work with Brooks to ensure that he would 
meet the requirements.49 According to the court’s records, Brooks 
seemed satisfied with this information and no longer expressed 
concern about his potential jury service.50 
Thus, the Court found the prosecutor’s second reason for striking 
Brooks—that in an effort to quickly resume his student teaching 
duties, Brooks might find the defendant guilty of a lesser verdict 
without a penalty phase—to be “highly speculative.”51 Snyder’s trial, 
the Court noted, was extremely short, a fact that “the prosecutor had 
anticipated on the record during voir dire,” and, therefore, Brooks 
would have missed just “two additional days of student teaching.”52 
The Court, examining this evidence cumulatively, held that “[w]hen all 
of these considerations are taken into account, the prosecutor’s 
second proffered justification for striking Mr. Brooks is suspicious.”53 
The Court’s suspicions deepened when it compared the 
circumstances surrounding Brooks’s dismissal with the prosecutor’s 
failure to strike other jurors who asked to be excused due to future 
conflicts. For instance, Roland Laws, a potential white juror and self-
employed general contractor, claimed that serving on the jury would 
present great difficulties: he had pressing family issues and he would 
not be able to complete his work projects, including a home that the 
buyers had planned to occupy in just a few days.54 
 
 47. Id. at 1209–10. 
 48. Id. at 1209. 
 49. Id. at 1210. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1208, 1210. 
 52. Id. at 1210. 
 53. Id. at 1211. 
 54. Id. 
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The Court also noted another potential white juror, John Donnes, 
who the prosecutor did not use a peremptory challenge to strike, 
despite the fact that Donnes expressed great concern that as a juror, 
he would “‘have to cancel too many things,’ including an urgent 
appointment at which his presence was essential.”55 The Court 
explained that the prosecutor’s decision not to strike Laws and 
Donnes suggested that he was not “sincerely concerned that Mr. 
Brooks would favor a lesser verdict than first-degree murder in order 
to shorten the trial.”56 
Thus, after examining the third prong of the Batson test, the Court 
found “[t]he prosecution’s proffer of this pretextual explanation 
naturally gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.”57 The 
Court concluded that there was a Batson violation and overturned 
Snyder’s first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. In his 
dissent, however, Justice Thomas noted that the majority opinion paid 
only “lipservice to the pivotal role of the trial court” identified in 
Batson.58 Thomas questioned the majority’s claimed deference to a 
trial court’s determination of a discriminatory peremptory strike 
except when the determination is “clearly erroneous.”59 Thomas found 
no precedent for the standard that the majority adhered to in its 
analysis: the majority decision second-guessed the trial court’s 
determinations because the trial judge did not make specific findings 
with regard to each of the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations for 
the peremptory strike.60 Instead, Thomas noted that if there was 
ambiguity in the reasons for the trial court’s determination, the 
Court’s application of deferential standard called for a presumption 
against a belief that the trial court’s decision was “clearly erroneous.”61 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s holding in Snyder v. Louisiana seems unlikely to 
answer concerns reminiscent of those previously raised by Justices 
Breyer and Thurgood Marshall.62 In Miller-El v. Dretke, Justice Breyer 
 
 55. Id. at 1212. 
 56. Id. at 1211. 
 57. Id. at 1212. 
 58. Id. at 1213. 
 59. Id. at 1208, 1213. 
 60. Id. at 1213. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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agreed with Justice Marshall’s assessment that the Court’s ruling in 
Batson v. Kentucky would not end the use of racially discriminatory 
peremptory challenges. Instead, Breyer, like Marshall, asserted that 
this goal could only be attained through the complete elimination of 
such challenges.63 While Snyder seems to have been an attempt to 
address Justice Breyer’s call to “reconsider Batson’s test,”64 the 
majority opinion does not hint that the Court will consider the 
elimination of peremptory challenges at any time in the near future. 
Snyder holds that when claims of Batson violations are made, trial 
judges must be more critical of the race-neutral reasons prosecutors 
give for the use of peremptory challenges. It is hard to ignore, 
however, Justice Breyer’s poignant words in Miller-El, in which he 
noted that the third step in the Batson test is the most important step, 
because at this point judges must “engage in the awkward, sometimes 
hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s instinctive 
judgment—the underlying basis for which may be invisible even to 
the prosecutor exercising the challenge.”65 The Court’s opinion seems 
to have overlooked the very real likelihood that at times it may be 
impossible for a trial judge to determine the reason for the 
prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge, even with the advantage 
of first-hand observation.66 Critics have suggested that Batson is 
inherently flawed in this respect, as an attorney may unconsciously 
discriminate on the basis of gender or race in making peremptory 
challenges.67 While a peremptory challenge is unconstitutional if made 
on the basis of the potential juror’s race or gender, it is an attorney’s 
unconscious discrimination, which results from “normal cognitive 
processes that form stereotypes,” that influences the attorney’s often 
instinctual decision that a potential juror would not be favorable to 
his or her client.68 Thus, the attorney’s stereotypes impact the way that 
he or she processes information about the potential juror.69 
 
 63. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266–67 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring)). 
 64. Id. at 273 (Breyer, J. concurring).  
 65. Id. at 267–68. 
 66. See Page, supra note 8, 156 (noting that psychological research has indicated that 
attorneys are often unaware that they have exercised a peremptory challenge as a result of a 
juror’s race or gender, and thus that “the Batson peremptory challenge framework is woefully 
ill-suited to address the problem of race and gender discrimination in jury selection.”). 
 67. Id. at 180, 207–08. 
 68. Id. at 180. 
 69. Id. at 207–08. 
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Time will tell whether Snyder’s refinement of Batson, requiring 
trial judges to more critically analyze race-neutral reasons given for 
peremptory challenges, will decrease the racial discrimination that 
currently pervades the jury selection system.70 With the prevalence of 
jury consultants, who often consider elements such as demographics 
in determining which potential jurors to strike,71 as well as stereotypes 
that individuals are bound to have,72 one must wonder whether 
peremptory challenges can ever be race-neutral. 
If discrimination occurs subconsciously, lawyers and even jury 
consultants are as susceptible as anyone else to forming racially 
motivated biases, and in turn, allowing such biases to influence use of 
peremptory challenges.73 There is a very real possibility that a lawyer 
who strikes a potential juror may “be unaware that her discomfort 
with a particular jury is race-based, [and] might sincerely deny the 
allegation.”74 While it is clear that Batson issues will continue to be 
raised in courts, it does not seem that Snyder will lessen the frequency 
of litigation based on these issues. 
 
 
 70. See, e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266–73 (Breyer, J., concurring); Note: Judging the 
Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2142 (2006) (detailing a need to eliminate peremptory 
challenges completely to limit prosecutorial discretion, noting that “prosecutors’ knowledge that 
they can use peremptory challenges to impanel an all-white or nearly all-white jury inflates their 
estimated chances of success, as convicting a minority defendant is easier before a monoracial 
jury than it is before a cross-representative jury. In this way, peremptory challenges lead 
prosecutors to discount the cost of convicting minority defendants.”); see also supra note 8. 
 71. See supra note 7. 
 72. See supra note 8. 
 73. Camille A. Nelson, Symposium: Procedural Justice: Perspectives on Summary 
Judgment, Peremptory Challenges, and the Exclusionary Rule: Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons 
from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1718 (2008). 
 74. Id. (citing Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 326 (2007)). 
